

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01     DACCA 04497 01 OF 04 210241Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
      INR-10 NSAE-00 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 MCE-00 OMB-01  
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INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 DACCA 4497

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS MPOL XX  
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FY1980  
          BANGLADESH

REFS: A. SECSTATE 167901 DTD 010215Z JUL 78  
      B. SECSTATE 168320 DTD 031928Z JUL 78  
      C. SECSTATE 182987 DTD 192201Z JUL 78

1. INFORMATION PROVIDED BELOW IS KEYED TO SUBPARAGRAPHS  
UNDER PARAGRAPH 3A, REFTEL A.

A. PARA 3A(1). PRIMARY U.S. INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY  
THE IMET PROGRAM WITH BANGLADESH ARE THE ENHANCEMENT OF THAT  
COUNTRY'S INTERNAL SECURITY, THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL  
STABILITY AND THE CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH  
DEVELOPMENT CAN TAKE PLACE. THE IMET PROGRAM HELPS TO  
PROVIDE INCREASED MANAGERIAL SKILLS, TACTICAL ABILITIES,  
PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND IN-COUNTRY TRAINING CAPABILITIES  
FOR THE MILITARY WHICH SHOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE  
OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANGLADESH MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT, THE MOST COHESIVE INSTITUTION IN A

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PAGE 02     DACCA 04497 01 OF 04 210241Z

COUNTRY WHERE EXPERIENCED LEADERSHIP IS LIMITED. EFFORTS  
THROUGH THE IMET PROGRAM TO PROMOTE AN INTERNALLY STABLE  
BANGLADESH ALSO SERVE OVERALL US INTERESTS OF REGIONAL  
STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA. SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
BOJECTIVES:

- TO ENHANCE THE BANGLADESHI'S SENSE OF NATIONAL

SECURITY, AND THEREFORE CONTRIBUTE TOWARD REGIONAL SECURITY.

- TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO COPE WITH INTERNAL THREATS TO STABILITY.
- TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AMERICANS AND BANGLADESHIS (THE MILITARY SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE PART OF THE NATION'S GOVERNING ELITE FOR SOME TIME TO COME)
- TO COUNTER TO SOME EXTENT THE INFLUENCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRC.
- TO PROVIDE THE BANGLADESHIS WITH ACCESS TO WESTERN MILITARY THOUGHT.

B. PARA 3A(2). THE BDG PERCEIVES A CONTINUING THREAT OF POSSIBLE INCURSIONS FROM BOTH INDIAN AND BURMESE TERRITORY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ENGAGED IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND BURMA IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CROSS-BORDER INCURSION. THOSE WITH INDIA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, FOLLOWING THE MARCH 1977 CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT THERE. THE BASIC BANGLADESH STRATEGY TO MEET THE PERCEIVED THREAT IS TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY TO AVOID GIVING INDIA A PRETENSE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN BANGLADESH. WITH REGARD TO A DIRECT ATTACK FROM INDIA, BANGLADESH STRATEGY IS TO DELAY AND CONTAIN SUCH ATTACK UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN APPLY PRESSURE TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE BDG PERCEIVES AN INTERNAL THREAT TO LAW AND ORDER IF GENERAL ECONOMIC  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03     DACCA 04497 01 OF 04 210241Z

CONDITIONS WORSEN OR IF OTHER EVENTS OCCUR THAT COULD CAUSE WIDESPREAD POPULAR UNREST. STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS SINCE 1975 HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY. TO MEET ANY INTERNAL THREATS IN THE FUTURE, THE BDG WOULD HAVE TO CALL UPON THE MILITARY TO ACT IN SUPPORT OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TO ASSURE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COULD BE CONTINUED. MAINTENANCE OF DOMESTIC STABILITY WOULD DEPEND UPON TRAINED AND RESPONSIVE MILITARY FORCES LOYAL TO THE REGIME IN DACCA.

C. PARA 3A(3). THIS MISSION CONSIDERS THE EXTERNAL THREAT OF SIZEABLE BORDER INCURSIONS FROM INDIA OR BURMA TO HAVE DIMINISHED SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE DESAI REGIME AND SINCE THE RECENT BDG NEGOTIATIONS WITH BURMA CONCERNING THE ARAKAN REFUGEE QUESTION. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT CHANGING CONDITIONS INTERNAL TO BANGLADESH OR IN THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COULD NOT RESULT IN AN INCREASED THREAT, BUT THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE THREAT BOTH EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY.

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PAGE 01 DACCA 04497 02 OF 04 210311Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 MCE-00 OMB-01  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 156  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
CINCPAC HONOLULU

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 DACCA 4497

D. PARA 3A(4). THE BDG BELIEVES THAT A MODERN, WELL-EQUIPPED, WELL-TRAINED BUT RELATIVELY SMALL TRI-SERVICE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS BEST SUITED TO MEET THE

COUNTRY'S REUIREMENTS. THE MILITARY FORCES MUST BE ADEQUATE AND RESPONSIVE ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL ORDER AND STABILITY IN TIMES OF CRISES RESULTING FROM POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIAL UPHEAVELS OR FROM NATURAL DISASTERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ARMED FORCES MUST BE CAPABLE OF DELAYING OR CONTAINING LARGE-SCALE BORDER INCURSIONS UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN INTERVENE TO RESTORE PEACE.

E. PARA 3A(5). THE FORCE DISCUSSED ABOVE IS COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS OF INTERNAL SECURITY, REGIONAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRESS. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A FORCE WILL HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE STABLE SOUTH ASIAN ENVIRONMENT THE US SEEKS ON THE SUBCONTINENT.

F. PARA 3A(6). DEFENSE SPENDING IN BANGLADESH IS A REASONABLE AND MODEST PORTION OF THE TOTAL BUDGET.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 DACCA 04497 02 OF 04 210311Z

DEFENSE RELATED EXPENDITURES DURING FY77 AMOUNTED TO \$150 MILLION OR ABOUT 8 PERCENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED BUDGET. ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IS NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE, THERE IS CURRENTLY NO MAJOR PROBLEM WITH FOREIGN EXCHANGE GENERATED BY EXPORTS. THERE WAS A TOTAL OF \$496 MILLION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR FY 78 AS COMPARED TO A TOTAL OF \$1.3 BILLION IN IMPORTS. THE BDG MONEY POLICIES ARE PRUDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS EXECUTED A TIGHT SELECTIVE IMPORT POLICY. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES PRESENTLY AMOUNT TO \$200-250 MILLION WHICH COULD PROCURE 2-3 MONTHS WORTH OF IMPORTS IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. DEBT SERVICING IS NOT A CRUCIAL PROBLEM BUT IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT PROBLEMS WILL BECOME ACUTE AFTER 1980 WHEN PAYMENTS ON MOST OF THE PRESENT CONCESSIONAL LOANS WILL BEGIN. AT PRESENT, APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE ASSETS ARE CONSUMED BY DEBT SERVICING. THIS PERCENTAGE WILL RISE TO ABOUT 25 PERCENT BY 1982. THE BDG IS ASKING MANY COUNTRIES TO CHANGE THEIR LOANS TO GRANTS AND THEIR APPROACH HAS ALREADY HAD SOME SUCCESS.

G. PARA 3A(11). THE ZIA GOVERNMENT HAS STARTED A PROCESS TOWARD REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT UNDER WHICH DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD MANY BUT NOT ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AND MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN LARGELY DISBANDED. PRESIDENT ZIA WILL PROBABLY RETAIN STRONG EXECUTIVE POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT PROGRAMS TO MEET HUMAN NEEDS AND TO BETTER ASSURE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION. THE PRESENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROVIDES TRAINING IN MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL SKILLS WHICH CAN BE USED TO PROMOTE A MORE EFFICIENT, BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE RESPONSIVE MILITARY WHICH CAN ASSIST IN CREATING THE CLIMATE IN WHICH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, WITH  
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PAGE 03     DACCA 04497 02 OF 04 210311Z

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND NEEDS, CAN FLURISH. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE IMET TRAINING CONTINUE TO BE AIMED PRIMARILY AT TEACHING LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT SKILLS WHICH WILL ENABLE THE MILITARY TO BETTER CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY.

H. 3A(12). ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THE U.S.; SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1971 TOTALS APPROXIMATELY \$4.8 BILLION. THE FY79 PROJECTION FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES EQUALS \$878 MILLION. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES HAS BEEN IN MODEST AMOUNTS AND HAS MOSTLY BEEN IN THE FORM OF EQUIPMENT SALES, PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS AND TRAINING. CHINA HAS PROVIDED THE BDG WITH 8 MIG19 JET FIGHTERS AND THE USSR HAS PROVIDED 10 MIG21 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO AGREED TO SELL A SMALL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING TRANSPORTS TO THE BDG. THE USSR HAS ALSO AGREED TO SPARE PARTS SHIPMENTS AND AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE OVERHAUL PROGRAM. SOME BANGLADESH AIR FORCE AND ARTILLERY PERSONNEL HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING IN CHINA, AND IN AUGUST 1977 CHINA AGREED TO PROVIDE BANGLADESH WITH ENOUGH ARTILLERY PIECES TO EQUIP THREE REGIMENTS AND TWO MORTAR BATTERIES. IN SEPTEMBER OF ZQOUU YUGOSLAVIA OFFERED A \$15 MILLION CREDIT TO BANGLADESH FOR DEFENSE PURCHASES. A FEW BANGLADESH MILITARY PERSONNEL RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE U.S., AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND INDONESIA EACH YEAR.

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PAGE 01 DACCA 04497 03 OF 04 210318Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 TRSE-00 EB-08 HA-05 MCE-00 OMB-01  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 157  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
CINCPAC HONOLULU

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 DACCA 4497

I. PARA 3A(13). FOLLOWING ARE THE VARIOUS LEVELS FOR IMET FUNDING (\$ IN THOUSANDS):

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL: \$128.5

(A) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL ALLOWS ATTENDANCE OF ONE OFFICER AT EACH SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOL, AND ONE ARMY OFFICER TO ATTEND EACH OF THE BRANCH ADVANCED COURSES. COURSES INCLUDED ARE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF, NAVAL STAFF, SENIOR OFFICER PREVENTIVE LOGISTICS, AND ADVANCED COURSES IN INFANTRY, ENGINEER, FIELD ARTILLERY, ORDNANCE, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE. ONE NAVAL COMMAND COURSE, A FLYING SAFETY AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COURSE FOR THE AIR FORCE ARE ALSO INCLUDED. ALL COURSES INCLUDE FOLLOW-ON INSTRUCTOR TRAINING.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT. THIS 50 PERCENT REDUCTION FROM FY 79 LEVELS WOULD PROVIDE ONLY THE SAME MINIMUM FOR PRESTIGE AND MINIMAL PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, AND WOULD GENERATE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS REGARDING USG COMMITMENT TO THE PROGRAM. BDG SUPPORT FOR USG INITIATIVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA WOULD POSSIBLY ALSO BE ERODED BY SUCH A CURTAILMENT.

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PAGE 02     DACCA 04497 03 OF 04 210318Z

(C) CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING MINIMUM LEVEL. BANGLADESH HAS NO VIABLE IN-COUNTRY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ABOVE BASIC RECRUIT/OFFICER ENTRANT TRAINING.

THE BDG ARMY, IN PARTICULAR, IS A STRONG FORCE IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, AND HAS THE TASKS OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIC ACTION CAPACITY. LACK OF AN IMET PROGRAM MAY CAUSE THE BDG TO TURN TO THRID WORLD AND SOVIET BLOC NATIONS, THEREBY LESSENING U.S. INFLUENCE. THIS LEVEL OF IMET FUNDING WILL INDIRECTLY LESSEN THE BDG'S ATTEMPTS AT CARRYING OUT SECURITY PROGRAMS BECAUSE THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF MILITARY AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING WITHIN THE MILITARY WILL MAKE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. THIS MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT THE GOVERNMENT'S PERCEIVED ABILITY TO ADHERE TO POLICIES THAT ENHANCE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH ADVANCE TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: \$190.5

(A) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. THIS FUNDING LEVEL WOULD ADD ONE ADDITIONAL OFFICER TO EACH ADVANCED COMBAT ARMS COURSE. AN AIR FORCE OFFICER WOULD BE PROGRAMMED FOR FLYING SAFETY AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION; AND A MID-GRADE NAVAL OFFICER WOULD ATTEND THE NAVAL COMMAND COURSE. ALL OFFICERS WOULD ATTEND FOLLOW-ON INSTRUCTOR TRAINING, AFTER COMPLETING THEIR ACADEMIC COURSES.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT OF DECREASING CURRENT BUDGET LEVEL. THIS PROGRAM DOES NOT ADDRESS DESIRED TECHNICAL TRAINING IN ALL ASPECTS OF MILITARY, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH BDG LACKS AN IN-COUNTRY CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE. IT EXCLUDES TRAINING FOR OFFICERS BELOW THE

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SECRET

PAGE 03     DACCA 04497 03 OF 04 210318Z

O-4 LEVEL AND JUNIOR OFFICERS RISING IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE TOWARD FUTURE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS. NEEDED

FLIGHT SURGEON TRAINING FOR A FLEDGLING AIR FORCE IS OMITTED.

(C) CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL. BASICALLY SIMILAR TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING THE BASIC LEVEL, EXCEPT THAT ANY INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF FUNDING FOR IMET WILL BETTER ENABLE THE MILITARY TO ACHIEVE ITS BASIC TASK OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING THIS PROGRAM ARE THAT THE BDG WILL HAVE A MORE DIFFICULT TIME IN CARRYING OUT HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN AN ATMOSPHERE OR LESS-EASILY ACHIEVED INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

(3) CURRENT LEVEL: \$250

(A) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL ADDS MIDDLE MANAGEMENT AND APPLIED TECHNICAL COURSES-SUCH AS, FLIGHT SAFETY, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, FLIGHT SURGEON, BUDGET, ELECTRICAL, AND ELECTRONICS COURSES FOR THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY. BOTH RANGER AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COURSES FOR MID-GRADE OFFICERS ARE ACCOMMODATED.

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PAGE 01     DACCA 04497 04 OF 04 210329Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 158  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
CINCPAC HONOLULU

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 DACCA 4497

(B) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF CONTINUING PROGRAM AT CURRENT LEVEL. THIS FUNDING LEVEL PROVIDES BOTH ADVANCED MANAGEMENT, PROFESSIONAL, AND TECHNICAL TRAINING TO ALLOW THE BDG TO DEVELOP A NEEDED IN-COUNTRY TRAINING CAPABILITY. IT PROVIDES A REASONABLE BALANCE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, THEREBY EXPOSING OFFICERS

TO U.S. VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS. REGIONAL STABILITY IS ALSO ENHANCED BY THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BANGLADESHI OFFICERS TO MEET AND BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY OFFICERS ATTENDING THE SAME CONUS SCHOOLS; THIS IS JUDGED ESPECIALLY VALUABLE FOR OFFICERS OF THIS RECENTLY FOUNDED NATION.

(C) CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING THE CURRENT LEVEL. THIS LEVEL WILL MAKE A DIRECT DISCERNIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATION BUILDING PROCESS WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND WILL HELP TO REINFORCE THE COUNTRY'S NONALIGNMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY. THE RESULTING INCREASE IN THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANGLADESH MILITARY WILL ENABLE THE BDG TO BETTER CARRY OUT HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASED INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL: \$359

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PAGE 02 DACCA 04497 04 OF 04 210329Z

(A) DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED. ONE ADDITIONAL OFFICER WOULD BE ENABLED TO ATTEND COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF AND NAVY STAFF COURSES. AN ADDITIONAL NAVAL COMMAND SPACE AND TWO QUOTAS FOR INSTRUCTOR PILOT TRAINING IN UH-1 HELICOPTERS AND ARE ALSO INCLUDED.

(B) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT OF INCREASING PROGRAM LEVEL. PROVISION OF THIS FUNDING WOULD PERMIT GREATER NUMBERS OF BANGLADESHI OFFICERS TO ATTEND PROFESSIONAL LEVEL TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR IMPLEMENTING SIMILAR IN-COUNTRY TRAINING PROGRAMS. THE POTENTIAL TO ORGANIZE BASIC HELO TRAINING FOR THE AIR FORCE WOULD ALSO BE ENHANCED BY HAVING TWO GRADUATES OF THE UH-1H INSTRUCTOR PILOT COURSE TO SERVE AS INSTRUCTIONAL CADRE.

(C) CONSEQUENCES OF APPROVING L INCREMENTAL LEVEL. THERE WOULD BE GREATER POTENTIAL FOR MORE RAPID INTRODUCTION OF EFFECTIVE, MODERNIZED MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL METHODS WITHIN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, DEPRIVED OF IN-DEPTH EXPERIENCED LEADERSHIP AND WEAKENED BY A DECADE OR MORE OF TURMOIL, WOULD MAKE QUICKER PROGRESS TOWARD ITS MAJOR SERVICES TO THE ACTION SUCH AS NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ASSISTANCE IN COPING WITH THE MANY NATURAL DISASTERS TO WHICH THIS COUNTRY IS SUBJECT.

J. PARA 3A(13)(I) AMBASSADOR'S BEST ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS ANTICIPATED FOR THREE BUDGET YEARS:

FY80 \$275 THOUSAND

FY81 \$300 THOUSAND

FY82 \$325 THOUSAND



SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 DACCA 04497 04 OF 04 210329Z

2. SUBPARAGRAPHS IN REFTTEL A NOT INCLUDED IN  
PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO BANGLADESH.  
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## Message Attributes

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